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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
BECKY LYNNE DRAPER, : Case No. 20040879-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
This case is before the Court for interlocutory review of two issues: (1) 
whether the child endangerment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003) is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ms. Draper in violation of due process; and 
(2) whether the district court erred in refusing to quash the bindover of Ms. Draper 
on one count of child endangerment. Although the state charged Ms. Draper with 
child endangerment based on its theory that drugs found in her house endangered 
the child, the state agrees that the magistrate bound Ms. Draper over on the charge 
of child endangerment based solely on the state's theory that Ms. Draper 
endangered her child through nursing. State's brief at 9. Accordingly, this Court 
can uphold the bindover, challenged by Ms. Draper in Point II, only if there is 
probable cause to believe Ms. Draper committed the crime of child endangerment 
by nursing her child. 
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Although the magistrate refused to bind Ms. Draper over on the charge of 
child endangerment based on the state's theory that the child was exposed to drugs 
that were found in the house, the state's "drugs in the house" theory is 
nevertheless pertinent to Ms. Draper's vagueness as applied argument in Point I. 
Because the state pursued a child endangerment chcirge based on its theory that the 
child was exposed to drugs found in the house, Ms. Draper's claim that the child 
endangerment statute is vague as applied to her necessarily implicates the state's 
"drugs in the house" theory as well as the nursing theory. While Ms. Draper 
successfully defended against the drug theory causing the magistrate to refuse to 
bind over on that theory, the "drugs in the house" theory nevertheless was applied 
to her. Ms. Draper's claim that the statute is vague as applied to her therefore 
encompasses the state's claim that she endangered her child because drugs were 
found in the house. As set forth more fully in Appellant's opening brief and 
below, the child endangerment statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
Ms. Draper and the evidence failed to establish probable cause to believe she 
committed the crime of child endangerment by nursing her child on or about 
January 9, 2004. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO 
MS. DRAPER. 
In this interlocutory appeal, Ms. Draper challenges the child endangerment 
statute as applied to her because the statute fails to give adequate notice and allows 
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for arbitrary enforcement under the circumstances of this case. Because the 
charge relied on two theories and forced Ms. Draper to defend against both 
approaches, both the "drugs in the house" theory and the nursing theory are 
pertinent in determining whether the statute is vague as applied to Ms. Draper. 
Since the statute fails to give notice that Ms. Draper's behavior would give rise to 
a charge for child endangerment and also fails to establish minimal guidelines for 
enforcement under either circumstance, the statute is unconstitutionally vague. 
A facial challenge on vagueness grounds will be upheld "'only if the 
[statute] is vague in all of its applications.5" State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ^|12, 
84 P.3d 1171. Where a statute is not vague in all of its applications, it 
nevertheless is unconstitutional in violation of due process if it is vague in its 
application to the defendant. Id In other words, when the statute is used to 
prosecute a defendant so as to give rise to charges in a context where the statute 
does not give notice and/or allows for arbitrary enforcement, the defendant can 
challenge the statute as applied to her. See generally State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 
TJ45 n. 15, 99 P.3d 820 (indicating that courts examine a statute in light of a 
defendant's conduct unless statute is vague in all of its applications); McGee v. 
Martinez, 555 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990) (indicating that a person who 
is charged or threatened with prosecution under a statute has a sufficient stake to 
pursue adjudication of the constitutionality of the statute). The child 
endangerment statute is vague as applied to Ms. Draper because it fails to give 
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notice and allows arbitrary enforcement in the two areas the state used to 
prosecute her. 
Although for purposes of the vagueness review, the state would like to 
discard its theory that Ms. Draper committed child endangerment because drugs 
were in the house, the record demonstrates that the child endangerment statute was 
applied to Ms. Draper using this theory. In fact, at the preliminary hearing the 
state argued only that the drugs in the house theory supported the child 
endangerment charge. R. 179:28-29. While the magistrate refused to bind 
Ms. Draper over on this theory, Ms. Draper nevertheless was forced to appear and 
defend against this application of the statute. The trial judge recognized that the 
statute, as applied to Ms. Draper, incorporated both the drug theory and the 
nursing theory when he focused on both approaches in analyzing the statute. 
R. 165. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the child endangerment 
statute as applied to Ms. Draper, stating (1) "the marijuana, bongs and pipes lay 
open or were visible and the child was not protected from them"; and (2) "an 
inference that the Defendant was using drugs prior to nursing her child is 
reasonable" and the statute might therefore apply. R. 165. For purposes of 
determining whether the child endangerment statute, as applied to Ms. Draper, 
passes constitutional muster, both of the state's theories are therefore relevant, as 
recognized by the trial judge. 
In assessing whether the child endangerment statute is unconstitutionally 
vague, this Court must determine whether the statute is sufficiently precise so as to 
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give notice that the conduct is punishable under the statute and also so as to 
preclude arbitrary enforcement in both of the contexts utilized by the state in this 
case. Although the state tries to characterize the issue as solely a question of 
whether Ms. Draper has a constitutionally protected right to "smok[e] marijuana 
and then breast-feed[ ] her baby" (state's brief at 11), the issue presented in this 
case is more defined and precise than the state's gross simplification. Instead, in 
the context of the nursing theory, the issue is whether the language of the child 
endangerment statute which outlaws allowing a child to be exposed to a controlled 
substance gives adequate notice that breast feeding a child at some point after 
ingesting marijuana can be prosecuted under the statute, and perhaps more 
importantly, whether the "exposed to" language leaves judges, prosecutors and 
police officers to decide whether a defendant's behavior in breast feeding at some 
point after ingesting marijuana allowed her child to be exposed to a controlled 
substance. Moreover, because the state also utilized the statute to prosecute 
Ms. Draper for child endangerment based on drugs found in the house, this Court 
must determine whether the statute also gives adequate notice and/or allows for 
arbitrary enforcement in that context. 
While the state would like this Court to adopt its generalization that 
children of drug users are always endangered and mothers who use marijuana at 
some point then nurse always endanger their children (see state's brief at 23), due 
process requires more precision. In fact, the state's discussion regarding the 
heightened risks and dangers to children of illicit drug abusers on page 23 of its 
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brief suggests that the state believes that child endangerment charges could be 
upheld simply because a parent is a drug user because such a parent exposes the 
child to controlled substances. Rather than supporting the state's argument that 
the term "exposed to" is not unconstitutionally vague, this discussion actually 
highlights the vagueness of the term "exposed to" since the state seems to argue 
that Ms. Draper's child was "exposed to" controlled substances and danger simply 
because she was a parent who had used marijuana at some point. Pursuant to the 
state's argument, all parents who have used illegal drugs could be charged with 
child endangerment in addition to drug related charges because such parents have 
exposed their children to controlled substances. Such an expansive reading of the 
child endangerment statute impinges on the two touchstones of the due process 
vagueness protection by failing to give notice and at the same time giving rise to 
arbitrary enforcement. 
The trial court in this case decided that Ihe statute was not vague as applied 
to Ms. Draper because drugs and paraphernalia were laid open or visible, and the 
child was therefore exposed to the items. R. 165.1 According to this rationale, 
any drugs which are visible in a house would give rise to a child endangerment 
charge regardless of whether the child was able to see the drugs or was actually 
endangered by them. As outlined in Appellant's opening brief, such an 
1
 Assuming the definition for expose is "to lay open," under the language of the 
statute, it is the child that must be exposed to or laid open, not the drugs. The trial 
court's conclusion that the drugs were visible or laid open essentially concludes 
that the drugs were exposed to the child and not that the child was exposed to the 
drugs, as required by the statute for there to be a violation. 
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application of the child endangerment statute fails to give notice that conduct can 
be prosecuted under the statute and also fails to establish minimal guidelines for 
enforcement. 
Applying the child endangerment statute based on the state's nursing theory 
also violates due process in the context of this case. Because there is no evidence 
that Ms. Draper nursed her child in close proximity to her use of marijuana nor 
that any marijuana residue passed to the child or created a risk or danger for the 
child, the state is relying on an undefined and expansive reading of the word 
"expose." The state is applying the word "expose" in this context to indirect 
conduct that might or might not have some effect on the child, without any 
evidence supporting an actual impact. Under such circumstances, the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague. 
While multiple meanings might not render a statute unconstitutionally 
vague, terms in a statute that leave prosecutors and police officers free to decide 
what conduct is prohibited and which fail to give a person of ordinary intelligence 
notice do render a statute unconstitutionally vague. In this case where the state 
has used the statute to prosecute Ms. Draper without any showing of impact, harm, 
potential harm or effect, the term "expose" has been given such an expansive 
reading that it is rendered unconstitutional. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE MS. DRAPER EXPOSED HER 
CHILD TO CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES BY NURSING HER. 
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As the state concedes, the only theory that can be used in support of its 
child endangerment charge against Ms. Draper is the theory that Ms. Draper 
endangered her child by nursing her. State's brief at 9. Because the magistrate 
refused to bind Ms. Draper over based on the state's "drugs in the house" theory, 
that theory cannot be considered in determining whether to uphold the bindover. 
Evidence that Ms. Draper nursed her child on January 20 along with her 
admission that she used marijuana on January 9 failed to establish probable cause 
to believe that she "exposed" her child to marijuana because (1) the state failed to 
introduce reliable evidence that marijuana could be transmitted through breast 
milk so as to expose a child to controlled substance, and (2) the state failed to 
establish probable cause to believe that, even if marijuana would pass through 
breast milk so as to expose a child, Ms. Draper subsequently nursed her child in 
close enough proximity to her marijuana use so as to expose the child. See 
Appellant's opening brief at 37-47. Rather than pointing to specific evidence 
establishing probable cause to believe that Ms. Draper exposed her child to 
marijuana by nursing her in close proximity to her drug use, the state asks this 
Court to speculate that Ms. Draper must have nursed her child shortly after 
ingesting marijuana and that such nursing was harmful as a matter of law. 
The state's request that this Court assume that Ms. Draper breast fed her 
baby shortly after ingesting marijuana and that if that were the case, she 
necessarily "exposed" her child to marijuana demonstrates the breadth and 
limitless application of the state's definition for the term "exposed to." Moreover, 
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it shows that the bindover cannot be upheld because the state did not present 
specific evidence supporting its charge. 
Although there is no evidence that Ms. Draper nursed her child shortly after 
she used marijuana, the state asks this Court to speculate that she must have 
"breast-fed her baby on the day she smoked marijuana two or three weeks earlier." 
State's brief at 28. While the district court drew the "inference" that Ms. Draper 
"was using drugs prior to nursing the child" (R. 168), the evidence shows only that 
Ms. Draper used marijuana on January 9 and eleven days later on January 20, 
nursed her child. Nursing mothers often utilize other methods in conjunction with 
breast feeding for nourishing their babies. Some mothers supplement with 
formula while others pump and freeze breast milk and subsequently feed that milk 
to the child. It is just as likely that Ms. Draper or a babysitter fed the child 
formula or stored breast milk on January 9 as it is that Ms. Draper breast fed her 
baby in close proximity to ingesting marijuana. The state's evidence simply fails 
to establish probable cause to believe that she "exposed" her child to marijuana 
when there is no evidence as to when she nursed the child following ingestion of 
marijuana, other than the evidence showing that she nursed her child eleven days 
later. 
In addition, the state did not present credible evidence that even if 
Ms. Draper had nursed her child in close proximity to her use of marijuana, she 
would have exposed her child to marijuana. See Appellant's opening brief at 44. 
As outlined in Appellant's opening brief, testimony from the DCFS investigator 
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that she told Ms. Draper about the dangers of nursing when using marijuana was 
multiple hearsay that was not presented for the truth of the matter asserted and 
instead was presented as part of the investigator's testimony regarding 
Ms. Draper's admission. R. 58. The parties understood that the testimony was not 
offered as substantive evidence that marijuana passes through breast milk as 
demonstrated by the fact that the prosecutor below did not rely on the 1 estimony 
and did not argue to the magistrate that the case should be bound over on the 
nursing theory, instead arguing only that the "drugs in the house" theory supported 
bindover. R. 179:28-29. 
Despite the fact that the prosecutor did not rely on the investigator's 
testimony or the nursing theory below, the state now argues not only that the 
bindover can be upheld on this basis, but also that the multiple hearsay testimony 
that was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted should be treated as 
expert testimony because Ms. Draper did not object to it at the preliminary 
hearing. State's brief at 29-30. The state ignores the fact, however, that its own 
prosecutor was not relying on the investigator's testimony for the truth of the 
matter asserted, did not pursue this case on the nursing theory during argument at 
the preliminary hearing and did not use the investigator as an expert in this area. 
The preliminary hearing transcript demonstrates that the state was pursuing the 
charge based on its "drugs in the house" theory; the magistrate rejected that theory 
but decided that the bindover was appropriate because Ms. Draper breast fed her 
child. Defense counsel should not be required to object at the preliminary hearing 
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to the state's failure to lay a foundation for presenting expert testimony in this 
context where the evidence was not presented for that purpose. In addition, the 
rules of evidence require a witness to be qualified as an expert in order to present 
testimony that requires scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. See Utah R. 
Evid. 702. The state's failure to present foundation or to qualify the investigator 
as an expert in this area or to rely on the testimony to support a nursing theory 
precludes reliance on this testimony as specialized expert evidence. 
Moreover, defense counsel raised her objection to the evidence in her 
motion to quash the bindover, thereby assuring that the trial court could consider 
the argument. A district court hearing a motion to quash a bindover does not sit in 
an appellate capacity. See State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). The 
district court need not give deference to the magistrate and instead "has the 
inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its original 
jurisdiction[] has been properly invoked." IcL at 466. While the preservation rule 
requires a defendant to present his claim to the district court, it does not preclude a 
district court from determining whether jurisdiction was properly invoked 
regardless of whether a defendant entered an objection before the magistrate. 
The case against Ms. Draper is based on speculation. While she was honest 
about her marijuana use on January 9, there is no evidence that she also nursed her 
child on that same day or that marijuana passes through breast milk so as to 
"expose" a child to a controlled substance. Although the standard for bindover is 
low, the state nevertheless must offer more than speculation to support the 
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elements of a charge. In this case where the evidence shows only that Ms. Draper 
admitted using marijuana on January 9 and subsequently nursed her child eleven 
days later, the state's case is built only on speculation and the charge should 
therefore be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Becky Lynn Draper, by and through counsel Joan 
Watt and Shannon Romero, respectfully requests that this Court hold that the child 
endangerment statute is void for vagueness in violation of due process or, in the 
alternative, order that the charge of child endangerment be dismissed because the 
state failed to establish probable cause to support the bindover. 
SUBMITTED this \q«- day of August, 2005. 
Cjkr . rx/^Y 
JOXN C WATT 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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